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Abstract: Banks do not charge explicit fees for many of the services they provide but the service 
payment is bundled with the offered interest rates. This output therefore has to be imputed using estimates 
of the opportunity cost of funds. We argue that rather than using the single short-term, low-risk interest 
rate as in current official statistics, reference rates should more closely match the risk characteristics of 
loans and deposits. For the euro area, imputed bank output is, on average, 24 to 40 percent lower than 
according to current methodology. This implies an average downward adjustment of euro area GDP (at 







JEL No. E01, E44, O47 
Key words: Bank output, FISIM, risk, loan interest rates, deposit interest rates. 
                                                     
1  This  research  was  supported  by  the  European  Commission,  Research  Directorate  General  as  part  of  the  7th 
Framework Programme, Theme 8, "Socio‐Economic Sciences and Humanities" and is part of the project “Indicators for 
evaluating international performance in service sectors”.  
 The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the European 
Central Bank. The work has benefited from useful comments and suggestions by Henning Ahnert, Giacomo Carboni, Jean-
Marc Israël, Steven Keuning, Christoffer Kok Sørensen, Reimund Mink and Christina Wang. We would also like to thank an 
anonymous referee for several useful comments; his suggestions have resulted in a much improved version of the paper. 
2  European Central Bank, Antonio.Colangelo@ecb.int. 
3  University of Groningen, R.C.Inklaar@rug.nl. 
 2
1. Introduction 
Banks do not charge explicit fees for many of the services they provide.4 Instead, the payment for the 
services is usually bundled with the interest rates charged on loans and paid on deposits. Any complete 
measure of bank output should take this into account by estimating what part of bank interest rates is a 
payment for services and what part is the cost of funds. In this paper, we argue that the estimation 
methodology that is currently used in the euro area (and in many other economies) needs to be reviewed 
to take into account the risk characteristics of loans and deposits and we present new euro area estimates 
based on our proposed methodology.5 
The key point of contention in estimating, or imputing, bank output is identifying the opportunity cost of 
funds. In current European National Accounts methodology, the inter-bank rate is used as the cost of 
funds for all types of loans and deposits.6 However, in recent theoretical work, Wang et al (2008) show 
that profit-maximizing banks would not use such an interest rate as a measure of the opportunity costs of 
funds. Instead, they would use an interest that reflects the (systematic) risk associated with each loan or 
deposit, so taking into account the risk of default and any term premium. Recently, the Wang et al (2008) 
methodology has been applied for US commercial banks in Basu et al (2009). They find that current 
methodologies overestimate US imputed bank output by 45 percent and US GDP by 0.3 percent. The 
contribution of this paper is to apply the Wang et al (2008) methodology to the euro area to establish 
whether or not the large overestimation is a common feature across countries. 
It is very important to have an accurate and appropriate measure for imputed bank output. First of all, it is 
part of overall banking sector output (in addition to fees and commissions) and insofar as banks serve 
households, government or foreign demand, imputed bank output contributes to overall GDP. 
Additionally, the interest margin is part of the price of bank output, so how this price is measured will 
affect overall producer and consumer prices. Our results are based on a benchmarking exercise that 
identifies opportunity costs of funds by estimating pass-through equations in an error-correction 
modelling framework. The findings imply that imputed bank output is, on average, overestimated by 24 
to 40 percent and euro area GDP (at current prices) is, on average, overestimated by between €12.6bln 
and €21.4bln or 0.16 to 0.27 percent. The higher numbers are estimated using the same conceptual 
approach as Basu et al (2009), so we conclude that euro area bank output is overestimated to the same 
degree as US bank output. 
                                                     
4  Where we talk about banks, we refer to the group of other Monetary Financial Institutions (MFIs), which mainly includes 
credit institutions and money market funds (MMFs); for more information, see Regulation ECB/2008/32. As the scope of the 
analysis is limited to loans and deposits, the bias resulting from the inclusion of MMFs is marginal; in fact, according to ECB 
estimates for 2006, deposits held with MMFs and loans granted by MMFs vis-à-vis non-MFI euro area residents accounted 
on the average for 0.02% of the corresponding total other MFIs loans and deposits.  
5  This paper concentrates on estimates of output at current prices. For details on the methodology for FISIM volume measures, 
see Eurostat’s Handbook on price and volume measures in national accounts (2001), and also Basu and Wang (2006) and 
Inklaar and Wang (2007). 
6  This is consistent with the recommendations of the System of National Accounts, see 1993 SNA, paragraph 6.128. 
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The paper is organised as follows. Section two describes the current methodology for estimating bank 
output in European statistics; Section three deals with our proposed methodology, presenting both its 
conceptual framework and the empirical set-up. The estimates from the new methodology are presented 
in Section four for the euro area7 as a whole and compared to imputed bank output derived according to 
the current European methodology.8 Finally, we offer some concluding remarks. 
2. Imputed bank output – current methodology 
Imputed bank output is commonly referred to as Financial Intermediation Services Indirectly Measured 
(FISIM) in official statistics. FISIM are the financial services that other MFIs and Other Financial 
Intermediaries (excluding insurance corporations and pension funds, OFIs)9 provide to their customers 
but which are not directly invoiced. For depositors, these services generally include the management of 
the accounts, the provision of accounts statements and fund transfers between accounts. Banks may 
charge explicit fees for deposit accounts, but in addition, the interest rate received on these accounts is 
typically lower than what customers could have obtained by lending their money directly on the market. 
For borrowers, these financial services include the screening and monitoring of their creditworthiness, 
financial advice, the smoothing over time of repayments, and the recording of the repayments for 
accounting purposes. They are paid by an increase of the interest rates charged by banks.  
In contrast, there is no intermediation service for debt securities: to the extent that a bank was involved in 
issuing or placing these securities, they will have received an upfront fee and to the extent that they 
bought these in the secondary market, they have not provided services. 
Paragraph 3.63.J of the 1995 ESA outlines the principles underlying FISIM compilation10. In particular, it 
states that in general financial intermediation services cover two parts: (a) financial intermediation 
services directly charged by financial intermediaries to their clients and measured as the sum of fees and 
commission charged; and (b) FISIM. 
The 1995 ESA identifies other MFIs and OFIs as being the only FISIM-producer sectors. 11 Their output is 
valued on the basis of the difference between the actual rates of interest payable and receivable on loans 
and deposits vis-à-vis other sectors (including the rest of the world) and a “reference” rate of interest. For 
                                                     
7  All estimates in the paper refer to the moving composition of the euro area, i.e. data prior to January 2007 do not include 
Slovenia and similarly, data prior to January 2008 do not include Cyprus and Malta. 
8  The FISIM estimates presented in this paper according to the methodology laid down in the Council Regulation (EC) No 
2223/93 of 25 June 1996 on the European System of National and Regional Accounts in the Community (1995 ESA), 
amended by Council Regulations (EC) 448/98 and 1889/2002, are not based on national official statistics but have been 
derived by the ECB simulating this methodology. In particular, whereas national results are only presented for euro area 
countries, the methodological framework proposed in the paper could be applied more in general to all EU countries. 
9  Other MFIs, OFIs and insurance corporations and pension funds are part of the financial corporations institutional sector. For 
a formal definition of financial corporations and the related sub-classification, see Paragraphs 2.32 to 2.67 of 1995 ESA. 
10  In the context of FISIM measurement 1995 ESA is fully consistent with the general framework set up in 1993 SNA. 
11  The results presented in this paper are limited to other MFIs’ output as a fully consistent and detailed set of statistics on other 
financial intermediaries (OFIs) is currently not available at the ECB for all euro area countries. In addition, under 1995 ESA 
insurance corporations and pension funds are not identified as producers of FISIM; while this treatment is not questioned in 
this paper, it could offer interesting perspectives for future research. 
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those to whom the intermediaries lend funds, both resident and non-resident, it is measured by the 
difference between the effective interest charged on loans and the amount that would be paid if a 
reference rate were used. For those from whom the intermediaries receive funds (under the form of 
deposits), both resident and non-resident, it is measured by the difference between the interest they would 
receive if a reference rate were used and the effective interest they actually receive. 
In turn, the reference rate is defined as the average interest rate at which FISIM-producer sectors lend 
money to each other12. In particular, the 1995 ESA distinguishes between an internal reference rate, to be 
used for transactions among residents, and an external reference rate, to be used for the business between 
residents and the rest of the world, with the possibility of compiling different external reference rates 
according to currencies of denomination and counterpart areas. 
The current approach has various shortcomings. Essentially, the method does not appropriately capture 
the differences between the various types of loans and deposits: for instance, whereas the inter-bank 
business is mainly short term with low default risk premium, deposits and loans from/to other sectors may 
have completely different maturity structure with sometimes high default risk. In summary, within the 
current methodological framework compensation for term premium and default risk is treated as 
productive service and leads in many instances to negative FISIM, both at the sectoral level and in the 
rest-of-the-world account.13 
3. The new methodology 
3.1 The conceptual framework14 
A measure of bank output cannot be estimated without a description of the financial services that 
customers buy. This is also the starting point of the model developed in Wang et al (2008) and this 
section is based on their arguments. It goes too far in an empirical paper like this to provide a full 
exposition of their general equilibrium model, so this section will focus on the main features and intuition 
of their model. The key conclusion of Wang et al (2008) and the earlier Wang (2003) studies regarding 
output measurement is that implicit compensation for bank services can be inferred from a bank’s total 
income by netting out the pure risk-based returns (i.e., costs of funds) on assets and liabilities held by the 
bank. To impute the cost of funds on any such risky financial instrument, one should use the rate of return 
on (debt) securities subject to the same risk, but without any services attached. Total income net of the 
pure costs of funds then measures the true value of bank services implicitly charged for. This conclusion 
                                                     
12  The reference rate is computed as a weighted average of money market rates that reflects the currency and maturity 
composition of the financial intermediaries’ lending market. The positions vis-à-vis the central banks are excluded from this 
computation. It also follows that when comparing reference rates for different reference areas, the average inter-bank rates 
may differ due to the currency and maturity composition of the market. As financial intermediaries include banks and OFIs, 
the reference rate may also diverge from the average inter-bank rate depending on the relative size of OFIs. 
13  Colangelo and Inklaar (2009) present two examples where negative margins may arise from mismatches between risk and 
maturity structure of specific instruments and the reference rate. For a more in depth analysis of the issue of negative FISIM 
on imports and exports see S. Fonte Santa (2007). 
14  This subsection draws heavily on a similar exposition in Basu et al (2009). 
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is summarized in Figure 1, which shows graphically how we impute the value of bank services related to 
loans ( AY ) and deposits ( DY ) using data on the interest rate paid on deposits ( Dr ), the interest rate 
charged on loans ( Ar ) and market interest rates on risk-free securities ( Fr ) and risky securities ( Mr ). 
This section first outlines the theoretical arguments for choosing these particular interest rates and next 
discusses our empirical implementation. 
Figure 1. Decomposition of a bank’s interest flows (simplified version) 
   
Notes: 
rA: (Average) interest rate received on loans 
rM: Expected rate of return required on market securities with the same (systematic) risk characteristics as the loans 
rF: Risk-free rate 
rF’: Short-term risk-free rate 
rD: (Average) interest rate paid on deposits 
YA: Nominal output of bank services to borrowers  
YD: Nominal output of bank services to depositors 
For a more detailed decomposition, see Wang (2003). 
3.1.1 Implicit bank services – the case of lending15 
Before any attempt to measure, one must first define a concept. So, what is the output of banks? Wang 
(2003) and Wang et al (2008) answer this question through models that embed optimal bank operations 
within the context of competitive financial markets. These papers recognize that the value added of banks 
lies in resolving information problems and processing transactions, not in generating returns on the 
resulting financial instruments. These returns are determined entirely by the instruments’ risk 
characteristics and market interest rates. In particular, in these models the value added of bank lending 
consists of screening and monitoring activities to mitigate asymmetric information problems with regard 
                                                     
15  For exposition of the theory, we focus on bank lending services because the measurement problem is made harder by the fact 
that the implicit revenue from services is bundled with risk-based asset (i.e. loan) returns. See Wang (2003) for detailed 
accounting of services to depositors. In the empirical application, we also measure services to depositors. 
rA 
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to borrowers’ creditworthiness.16 Bank services are analogous to other professional business services, 
such as legal, accounting and consulting services, and indeed analogous to all production in the economy: 
output is generated through a production process that uses primary inputs of labour and capital, as well as 
intermediate inputs (such as office supplies and utilities).  
In contrast, the purely risk-based returns that accrue to the stock of financial instruments held by banks 
are what investors would demand on any contingent claims with the same risk profiles, regardless of how 
these are created. These pure returns also correspond to the concept of the “user cost of funds,” defined as 
the (risky) future payoff from investment that compensates suppliers of funds for their forgone current 
consumption and for bearing risk, but not for any attached services.17 The costs of funds are part of the 
overall user cost of capital faced by the ultimate users of funds, such as non-financial firms. These are 
therefore part of those firms’ value added, not the value added of the banks that provide the funds.  
This paper concentrates on the measurement of nominal bank output, but to understand the models of 
Wang (2003) and Wang et al (2008), it is useful to consider briefly the concept of real output implied by 
these models. Real bank (lending) output consists of intermediation services that certify borrowers as 
credit-worthy at loan origination (screening) and on an on-going basis (monitoring). Thus, a natural 
measure of real bank output is the number of loans originated and monitored, just as a natural measure of 
the output of a “normal” service provider, like a barbershop, is the number of haircuts it provides. In 
principle, certain types of loans (for example, small business loans) may require more information 
processing than others (such as conforming mortgages). Thus, a refined measure of real output would 
augment the raw transactions count with some notion of “quantity of service,” just as a high-quality 
coiffure by Christophe of Los Angeles18 should be counted as being “more haircut output” than a haircut 
from the local barber shop. But in any measure of real bank output, the natural starting point is the 
number of transactions of each type performed. 
Inklaar and Wang (2009) count these transactions and aggregate them into an index of real bank output. 
The object of this paper, of course, is to measure nominal bank output accurately. In conjunction, these 
two papers imply a complete set of national income measures for banking—nominal output, real output, 
and an implicit price index for banking services. 
3.1.2 Loan interest rate spread – risk vs. implicit bank services  
The key measurement implication of Wang (2003) and Wang et al (2008) is that the nominal value of 
bank services that are not explicitly charged for can be imputed as total income net of the purely risk-
                                                     
16  Banks’ role in resolving information asymmetry is well recognized in the financial intermediation literature (e.g., see the 
survey by Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993). More recently, Allen and Santomero (2001) broaden the scope to recognize 
intermediaries’ role as providers of specialized financial expertise. This can be interpreted as a form of transaction facilitation 
and thus encompassed in our definition of bank value added. 
17  This can be viewed as an extension to what is often referred to as the “user-cost” framework. Diewert (1974) was one of the 
first to introduce this framework and Barnett (1978) first applies it to financial assets, introducing the concept of “user cost of 
money.” The key element of our extension is that it takes account of risk, that is, in the real world where the reward to 
essentially all investment is uncertain, the so-called “opportunity cost of money” is comparable across securities only after 
adjusting for risk. 
18  Who famously cut Bill Clinton’s hair on Air Force One at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). 
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based returns on the financial claims created by those services and held on the bank’s book. In the case of 
lending services, the pure cost of funds on a loan should be inferred using the rate of return on a market 
debt security with the same risk characteristics (but without any services attached). 
This method of matching risk is of the same nature as a common application of asset-pricing theory to 
corporate finance – the cost of capital for a specific investment project is set to equal the rate of return on 
“like” market securities. Both of these applications follow the same principle as the Arbitrage Pricing 
Theory in Ross (1976), where the expected rate of return on a portfolio is determined given the returns on 
“factor” portfolios and the absence of arbitrage opportunities.19 One obvious implication is that no firm—
and no bank—would use the return on risk-free securities as the appropriate opportunity cost for an 
investment with risky payoff. 
The logic of removing risk-adjusted returns from total bank income to impute the value of service output 
can be illustrated with a stylized example of “the bank that does nothing.”20 Specifically, assume 
frictionless financial markets, so that firms can borrow directly from households without the need for 
intermediaries to process information or transactions. The required (net) rate of return on any investment 
between periods t and t+1, denoted 1tr +%  (with the tilde emphasizing the random nature of the return), is 
determined by a stochastic discount factor, denoted mt+1, as follows:  
(1) t 1 1E [(1 ) ] 1t tr m+ ++ =% .  
Assume entities that function solely as accounting vehicles are set up as follows:21 households transfer 
their capital to these entities in exchange for claims on the entities, which then rent the capital to 
production firms. By design, these entities have balance sheets and income statements that look like those 
of banks, so they are called banks for short even though they perform no services.  
For simplicity of exposition, we assume these banks are fully equity funded. Note however that the 
banks’ capital structure is irrelevant for their cost of capital in this simple model economy since here the 
Modigliani-Miller (MM, 1958) theorem applies. More generally, Wang (2003) showed that the central 
message that the user cost of funds must take risk into account does not depend on whether the MM 
theorem holds. What remains is the practical matter of finding the market rates most commensurate with 
the risk of financial instruments held by banks, as we discuss later in detail. 
Now look at the cash flow of a representative bank. Households recognize that a bank here is just a 
bookkeeping device and that they ultimately own its assets – capital used in production. So they require 
the same rate of return on a bank’s equity as on those assets. The bank must therefore lend the funds to 
any firm at a rate set according to (1). Consequently, production firms face the same cost of capital as 
they would have if they had borrowed directly from households. Let t 1E ( )
i i
t tr r +≡ %  denote the expected 
                                                     
19  These are all examples of the so-called relative approach to asset pricing: the value of a specific risky investment is 
determined taking the value of all the other assets as given. See Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000) for other applications of 
this relative approach. One prominent example is pricing options. 
20  See Wang et al (2008) for a more detailed illustration in a general-equilibrium framework. 
21  The real-world analogy is a so-called special purpose vehicle, which is a pure financing arrangement off the balance sheet of 
the sponsoring institution. It involves virtually no operational activities. 
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rate of return on the loan to firm i with balance itA ; further denote total balance of the loan portfolio as At 
and the average rate of return on the portfolio as Atr . Then the expected interest income on the portfolio 
can be expressed as  
(2) A i it t t tir A A r=∑ , with it tiA A=∑  and A it i tir w r=∑  
i
i t tw A A=  is the weight of loan i in the portfolio. Note that At tr A  is also the expected dividend 
payment to the households who own the bank. 
The correctly imputed value of bank service output should be zero on average since by design the banks 
produce no real services.22 This is exactly the result if the value of services is imputed as the bank’s total 
income net of its risk-adjusted cost of funds, that is, 1ˆ( ) 0
A A
t t tA r r+ − ≈ , because 
1 1ˆ ˆ( ) 0
A A i i
t t i t ti
r r w r r+ +− = − ≈∑ , where 1ˆitr +  and 1 1ˆ ˆA it i tir w r+ +=∑  are the realized rate of return on loan i 
and on the portfolio, respectively.  
In contrast, if the value of services is imputed by subtracting risk-free returns from total income, as in the 
existing national income accounting practices, then on average the bank will be credited with producing 
positive output of services, since in general the expectation of 1ˆ 0
A F A F
t t t tr r r r+ − ≈ − > .23 This result 
follows directly from expanding (1), which applies to itr  and hence also to 
A
tr , and substituting 1
F
tr+  
for 11 E ( )t tm +  (which is itself an application of (1) to risk-free assets):  
(3) 1 1(1 )[1 cov( , )] 1
A F A
t t t tr r r m+ += + + − −% . 
F
tr  is the yield on a debt not subject to any risk
24 (e.g., default), nor with any embedded options.25 US 
Treasury’s are the best example.26 Ftr  only compensates investors for sacrificing current for future 
consumption with certainty. A security with risky payoff that cannot be diversified away and is 
(negatively) correlated with the stochastic discount factor, however, must in expectation pay a return 
premium 1 1cov( , )t tr m+ +−% , to make up for the risk-induced disutility.27 This premium is positive for 
almost all risky assets (see any finance text, e.g. Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay, 1997). 
This stylized example serves to intuitively highlight the conceptual problem of using the risk-free rate to 
impute bank output. Wang (2003) and Wang et al (2008) show that similar overestimation of bank output 
                                                     
22  To the extent the portfolio is sufficiently diversified and the persistence in aggregate shocks is accounted for, realized returns 
averaged across firms should basically equal the conditional expectation.  
23  The mirror image of this over-counting of bank output is the under-counting of borrowing firms’ output – reduced on average 
by ( )A Ft tr r−  simply because of the change in accounting method. 
24  This stylized example refers to a one-period ahead model, so that maturity does not really play a role; see also Section 3.1.3. 
25  Yields on bonds must be adjusted for the embedded option to be comparable with those on option-free debt instruments. 
Bonds that allow prepayment, such as MBS, essentially have an embedded call option.  
26  They are typically considered risk-free in that they earn a guaranteed return, Ftr , if the debt is held till maturity. Note that 
even for this type of debt there is still interest rate risk, that is, the holding-period return is almost surely uncertain if one sells 
it prior to the maturity date. 
27  In the consumption-CAPM model, which can be expressed as a specific case of (1), this means assets with payoff positively 
correlated with consumption growth have to pay a positive return premium. 
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arises in the realistic case where banks provide actual services – processing information and transactions 
– for which no explicit fees are charged but implicit compensation is earned via an interest rate spread.  
To infer the value of such implicitly priced services as part of banks’ net interest income, Wang (2003) 
solves for the optimal interest rate charged by a value-maximizing bank when making loans with the 
same (systematic) risk profile as a type of existing market debt. The usual first-order condition gives rise 
to the following expression for the rate of return (denoted Atr ) the bank should expect to earn on a loan 
portfolio: 
(4)             A M St t tr r r= + . 
t 1E ( )
M M
t tr r +≡ %  is the expected rate of return demanded by investors on the market debt with the same risk. 
S
tr  represents what we shall call the service spread, which generates the extra interest that compensates 
the bank implicitly for processing the loan. The optimal service spread Str  in (4) satisfies the condition 
that the extra interest receipt, St tr A , equals the (weighted average) marginal cost of processing a loan 
multiplied by the optimal markup.28 This markup is determined by competition in the loan market. 
In the nomenclature of the 1993 SNA, Mtr  in (4) is called the reference rate – serving as reference for the 
cost of funds on the loan. For a market rate to be the proper reference, the security should not only have 
similar risk, but banks should also face the same marginal tax rate and transaction costs faced by typical 
investors in the reference market debt.29 We argue that this is likely a reasonable assumption for the 
reference rates used in our empirical exercise, since most of the market securities chosen as references for 
bank loans are backed by securitized pools of loans, such as mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and the 
securities are routinely held on bank balance sheet along with those same categories of loans. That is, by 
revealed choices of asset allocation, banks appear to consider these securities as offering similar rates of 
return as the corresponding categories of loans. The reference rate for a portfolio of loans (of varying 
types, maturities and rate-reset dates) is then a weighted average of rates on the individual loans. 
3.1.3 Imputing the value of implicit bank services  
Derivations in the previous section imply that, on average, a bank’s nominal output of implicit lending 
services to borrowers should equal ( )S A Mt t t t tr A r r A= − . But neither of the expected rates of return, Atr  
and Mtr , is observed. So, for empirical estimations, we make use of the relationship that the expected rate 
                                                     
28  That is, the bank charges an implicit price for its intermediation service, equal to a markup on the marginal cost of producing 
that service. The cost is determined by a loan officer’s labour input in processing a loan, plus the amount of physical capital 
and supplies used for that task. 
29  For banks, additional distortions are introduced if deposit insurance is not fully risk sensitive (see Wang, 2003 for a detailed 
treatment). Here we assume that deposit insurance is fairly priced for the banking industry as a whole, and ignore 
distributional effects. 
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of return on a defaultable debt equals its promised yield to maturity (that is, the contractual interest rate, 




(5) k k kt t tr R d= − , k = M, A. 
t 1E ( )
k k
t td d +≡ % , where ktd  is the (random) default loss rate. For market securities, MtR ’s are generally 
observed while Mtd ’s can be estimated using time series data.
31 Similarly, for loans, Atd ’s can be 
estimated as well, while AtR ’s are covered in official statistics (at least in the euro area). Substitute (5) 
into (4) and we can impute the output of lending services as:32  
(6) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] tMtAtMtAttMtMtAtAttStAt AddRRAdRdRArY −−−=−−−== . 
For the purposes of this paper, due to lack of information on expected default rates, we will assume that ( ) 0≈− MtAt dd , leaving such measurement problem for future research.  
Hence reference rates vary across loan types, depending on risk characteristics of the loans or portfolio of 
loans associated with the services considered. In contrast, the use of a (nearly) risk-free rate as the 
reference rate would imply an overestimation of output:  
(7) ( ) ( )A F S P A Pt t t t t t t t tr r A r r A Y r A− = + = + , 
where P M Ft t tr r r= −  is the return premium of the reference risky market securities over (maturity-
matched) risk-free securities; it equals 1 1(1 )cov( , )
F M
t t tr r m+ ++ −%  (see (3) above). 
As described above, the methodology set up in 1995 ESA goes even further, proposing the use of a short-
term risk-free rate 'Ftr as the reference rate, thus including the term premium as productive service:  





t rrr −=  is the term premium. 
The value of output imputed according to (8) will overstate the actual value of service output. According 
to some, the informal justification for (8) is that t
T
t Ar  and t
P
t Ar  are regarded as compensation for 
rendering so-called “maturity transformation” and “risk-bearing” services. The conceptual framework 
presented in this paper argues against this treatment. First, the term premium entails no service as it 
simply reflects the assumptions about future interest rates as well as the compensation of the investors for 
having their money tied up for a longer period, including the added risk of the greater price uncertainty. 
In turn, Wang and Basu (2007, Section 3.4) discuss at length why risk bearing is not a productive service 
according to the conceptual framework of 1993 SNA. More importantly, they show that the National 
                                                     
30  ktd  equals the product of the probability of default (PD) and the expected loss rate given default. If the latter is near 100%, 
then ktd  is close to the PD. Wang (2003) details the distinction between promised yield and expected rate of return. The 
equation here is exact only for instantaneous returns, and is used as an approximation in discrete-time cases. See Duffie and 
Singleton (2003) for continuous-time models of defaultable debt pricing. 
31  The conditional estimate of Mtd , such as KMV’s EDF, is procyclical. 
32  See Wang et al (2008) for a detailed discussion of how the actual value in each period still deviates from this average. 
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Accounts imputation results in inconsistent accounting of the output of borrowing firms, by making 
firms’ measured value added depend on their sources of funding. Suppose two firms are identical, but one 
borrows from banks and the other from the bond market. Then the firm relying on banks is credited with 
producing lower value added than the one issuing bonds, even if their actual productive activities are 
identical. 33 
The value of implicit depositor services can be imputed in a similar manner to the new way we imputed 
the value of implicit lending services. Let Dt denote the deposit balance, and Dtr  the interest rate paid; 
M
tR  and 
M
td  are defined as above (but the values almost certainly differ). Then nominal output of 
depositor services can be imputed as: 
(9) ( )D M M Dt t t t tY R d r D⎡ ⎤= − −⎣ ⎦ . 
For insured deposits34, the relevant reference rate should be the risk-free (Treasury) rate, that is, 
M M F
t t tR r r= = , since 0== MtPt dr . For the remaining, uninsured, deposits, M M Ft t tR d r− > , because 
the deposit holders are exposed to some (default) risk in bank asset portfolios. In our empirical 
application, we abstract from this issue and effectively assume that all deposits are insured, and hence 
risk-free. Under our working assumptions, equation (9) then simplifies to ( ) tDtFtDt DrrY −= , while the 
1995 ESA methodology, based on the short-term risk free reference rate 'Ftr , computes bank output on 
deposits as  





t rrr −= , as above,  represents the term premium. It thus follows that the European National 
Accounts underestimate the value of depositor services.35 
Note that equation (6) implies that if a bank passively holds market securities in its investment portfolio, 
there are no services provided to the asset issuers (that is, YA = 0), since RA = RM and dA = dM. Likewise, 
(9) implies zero implicit services (that is, YD = 0) provided to holders of bank term liabilities (commercial 
paper, market bonds, and privately placed bonds), since the interest rate paid equals the reference rate (RD 
                                                     
33  Default risk management can be viewed as an insurance contract where the lender, acting as a guarantor, charges a premium 
(default risk premium) to the borrower in exchange of the risk of his potential default; this premium can thus be viewed as the 
expected loss of the loan. See also the section on loan guarantees in chapter 17 of the 2008 SNA. Drawing a parallel with the 
methodology in use to derive the output of non-life insurance corporations, or specifically, of credit insurance institutions 
may be of some interest in this context. In this case, output is derived as the difference between the collected premiums 
minus the payments or the calls under the guarantees. This would then argue in favour of the default risk correction, under 
the recognition that for insurance corporations the correction is done ex-post (discount of ‘realised’ defaults) while in the 
context of FISIM compilation it would be performed ex-ante (discount of ‘expected’ defaults). On the other hand, the risk 
assessment is clearly a productive activity that should be incorporated in FISIM; see also Keuning (2008). 
34  See Gropp, and Vesala (2004) for an analysis of the impact of deposit insurance on risk taking of banks. 
35  It should be underlined that before the financial turmoil in August 2007 perceived risk on the interbank market, measured as 
the difference between unsecured and secured interbank lending rates, was rather minimal. Besides deposit insurance this 
may then argue in favour of limited risk premiums on banks’ deposits. Since the start of the financial market turbulence the 
spreads between secured and unsecured interbank lending rates have widened considerably, and they have been passed 
through on deposits rates to a large extent. While this may justify the consideration that deposits are less secured than before, 
the impact on total FISIM calculation should be minimal as unsecured interbank lending rates are used as reference rates for 
most deposit categories (accounting, on the average, for about 90% of total deposits placed with other MFIs by households 
and non-financial corporations) thus guaranteeing that risk premiums are adequately reflected even in this case.    
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= RM and dD = dM). Also note that under virtually all circumstances (that is, whenever there are equity 
holders), (rM – dM) in (6) is greater than its counterpart in (9), because bank assets are typically riskier 
than bank liabilities. In other words, the reference rates for imputing lending and depositor services 
almost always differ by a positive margin. 
So again, recall that Figure 1 illustrates the imputed nominal output value of implicit bank services. In the 
case of loans only part of a bank’s net interest income constitutes nominal output of bank services; the 
remainder—corresponding to the risk and term premium in the case of loans, ( )Arr FM '− , —is 
excluded. Similarly, in the case of deposits a reference rate that excludes the term premium 
underestimates banking sector  output—by ( )Drr FF −' . The term and risk premiums, along with actual 
interest expenses on bank liabilities, constitutes a pure transfer of capital income. It is part of the factor 
income generated by the capital used in the borrowing firms’ production or in the consumption of 
consumers. This factor income is then transferred from the end users of funds to the ultimate suppliers of 
funds—the bank shareholders in case of loans, the depositors in the case of deposits. Only when all 
investors are risk neutral or all risk is idiosyncratic will this risk premium disappear. Figure 1 illuminates 
how our model-based output measure differs from the National Accounts’ current measure, which uses a 
(nearly) risk-free short-term rate as the single reference rate. As we have argued, the National Accounts’ 
measure incorrectly bank output as they do not reflect term and risk premiums appropriately In the 
remainder of this paper, we discuss how to estimate the quantitative impact of these components on the 
measured output of euro area banks. 
3.2 The empirical set up36 
The methodology developed in this paper to estimate the banking sector output on positions vis-à-vis 
households and non-financial corporations is mainly based on the use of MFI interest rate (MIR) 
statistics37. These statistics provide (on a monthly basis and for periods as from 2003) a harmonised and 
comprehensive coverage of the interest rates applied by euro area credit institutions to resident 
households and non-financial corporations on euro denominated loans and deposits. These data are 
available and consistent both at national and euro area level, and distinguish between the interest rate on 
new business, i.e. newly negotiated interest rates during the period, and rates on outstanding amounts. In 
addition, detailed breakdowns on deposits are provided both by maturity and by instrument, while for 
loans the data are broken down by maturity/period of fixation and additionally, in the case of households, 
by purpose of the loan, i.e. consumer credit, loans for house purchases and other credit. While the current 
approach implicitly relies on MIR rates on outstanding amounts, the methodology developed in this paper 
uses statistics on new business. Section 3.2.1 below will discuss some methodological aspects underlying 
this approach. 
                                                     
36  Although the paper is mainly focused on the derivation of FISIM estimates for the euro area as a whole, the empirical set-up 
of the methodology could easily be replicated at national level. 
37  The requirements for MIR statistics are laid down in Regulation ECB/2001/18. In particular, it should be underlined that the 
reporting scheme defined in the Regulation applies only to other MFIs, thus excluding central banks and MMFs. For further 
information, see http://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/interest/interest/html/index.en.html. 
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As described above, another feature of the current approach is the use of the inter-bank rate as the 
reference rate to evaluate interest margins. The first proposed improvement (in the case of households and 
non-financial corporations) is to take into account the maturity structure of loans and deposits based on 
the general government bond yield curve38 and, for short maturities, money market rates; in this paper we 
use the euro area government bond yield curve derived by Thomson Reuters Datastream based on AAA 
government bonds issued in the euro area.39 In the absence of detailed information on the average 
maturity/period of rate fixation for each category of loans and deposits for households and non-financial 
corporations, the matching with the relevant reference rates has been conducted via a benchmarking 
exercise based on the estimation of a pass-through equation (using an error-correction modelling 
framework) against alternative market rates.40 Table A1 in Appendix 1 describes in detail which rate has 
been identified on the basis of standard model selection criteria for each loan and deposit category under 
this approach. Overall though, it should be underlined that the results are not very sensitive to the exact 
reference rates’ choices we make. 
Secondly, while deposits are usually considered as (relatively) risk-free investments because of deposit 
insurance schemes, bank loan rates are higher because of longer maturities but also because of higher 
risk.41 Data on the yield on bonds, specifically indices of non-financial corporate bonds and of asset-
backed and residential mortgage-backed securities can be used to take this into account42. The indices we 
use are compiled by Merrill Lynch which provides information on the average yield of the bonds after 
adjusting for option-like features of these bonds. For those indices Merrill Lynch also makes available the 
average residual maturity of the underlying bonds, thus allowing for a maturity correction to take into 
account the different average maturity structure of the bond indices compared to the various deposits and 
loans categories. Section 3.2.2 describes in detail the use of these data in the context of FISIM 
measurement. Table A2 in Appendix 1 reviews the reference rates applied to each type of loans and 
deposits for households and non-financial corporations under this more complex approach. 
                                                     
38  The government bond yields are based on (notional) zero-coupon bonds, so the duration of these bonds is equal to its 
maturity. Most bank loans will have regular interest payments, so the duration of those loans will be smaller than their 
maturity. For most maturities, this distortion is likely to be small. Assuming annual interest payments of a 5 percent interest 
rate, the duration will be on average 10% of a year shorter than the maturity for the bracket of one to five year maturity. 
39  An alternative approach would be to rely the interest swap yield curve. Although this could offer interesting perspectives as 
swap rates reflect banks’ refinancing costs, it does not fully respect the theoretical framework suggested in this paper: while 
reference rates should include only the term premium, risk components in swap rates (mainly counterparty risk) are rather 
high and if historically their spreads on government bonds (the so-called swap spreads) were about 35bp up to August 2007, 
these have increased considerably after the start of the turmoil. 
40  Appendix 2 briefly discusses this approach and provides an overview of the results of the estimations. 
41  It is important to notice that the dispersion among euro area countries in the level of MFI interest rates is rather high. This 
reflects differences in credit risk and market structure but also institutional factors like regulation and taxation; see ECB 
(2006) for a detailed review of these aspects. Focusing on the housing loans market, Kok Sørensen and Lichtenberger (2007) 
show that a significant part of the interest rate differences across the euro area are related to country specific institutional 
aspects such as enforcement procedures, loan-to-value ratios and fiscal arrangements. 
42  Another way of indirectly performing the correction would be to use data on loan provisions which may be collected for 
financial stability purposes by national authorities; in practice this approach may lead to incomparable results due to the lack 
of harmonisation of statistics on loan provisions across countries. 
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For the other sectors, as well as for cross border positions, some working assumptions are applied due to 
lacking basic data; in Section 3.2.3 below we will argue that this approach is likely to lead to more sound 
estimates compared to the current framework. 
Under both approaches, the margins derived at the level of the breakdowns by maturity or period of initial 
rate fixation are opportunely averaged on the basis of the new business volumes; the resulting average 
margins for each loan and deposit category are then applied to the total amounts outstanding to calculate 
the corresponding FISIM.43 
3.2.1 Interest rates for households and non-financial corporations 
The main aim of our research is to improve the estimates of interest margins applied by banks on loans 
and deposits to reflect the services they provide. A first question is whether to use the ‘new business’ 
(NB) or ‘outstanding amounts’ (OA) rates as the basis for comparison. While the estimated margin should 
be relevant for the entire portfolio of bank loans in that category thus arguing for OA rates, a drawback of 
this approach is that the correct reference rate is difficult to define as many such loans have interest rates 
that were agreed some years before. Ideally, the reference rate should then be a weighted average of past 
bond yields, where the weights reflect the share of loans from each period in the past that are still on 
banks’ balance sheets.  
In addition, current definitions of NB and OA interest rates are not homogeneous for different maturities. 
NB rates are categorised according to the initial period of rate fixation while OA rates are categorised 
according to the original time to maturity of the loan44. Hence, for instance, if a loan has an original 
maturity of seven years, but rates are renegotiated annually, it would be more appropriate to compare the 
interest rate on this loan to the yield on a bond with a time to maturity of one year rather the seven 
years.45 Given these considerations, we will rely on the NB rates to calculate the interest margins46.47  
                                                     
43  It can be argued that this approach could lead to overestimating the total value of the banking sector output as some of the 
services on loans, for instance, could be provided only at the time of agreeing on or renegotiating the terms. This bias should 
be anyway non-significant for non-financial corporations as most these loans have initial rate fixation below one year, but 
could be more problematic for households. Still, this approach looks more sound than relying on new business volumes only, 
thus neglecting those services that are provided during the entire life span of deposits and loans. 
44  For a detailed discussion of the characteristics of MIR statistics, see also the “Manual on MFI interest rate statistics.” 
45  Following the implementation of the new requirements for MIR statistics as set-up in Regulation ECB/2009/7, new data will 
become available to partly address this limitation. In particular, data will be collected on new business loans to non-financial 
corporations with period of initial rate fixation below one year and original maturity over one year. 
46  In this paper we do not take into consideration interest rate statistics on bank overdrafts that are available in the context of 
MIR statistics. In fact, this category currently includes negative balances on current accounts, revolving loans (including 
those obtained through a line of credit) and, in some countries, also loans without fixed maturity. The difficulty of matching 
the resulting interest rates with reference rates reflecting maturity and risk characteristics of these instruments leads us to 
leave them out of the scope of the paper. It should also be underlined that in the case of households these statistics would not 
be available broken down by purpose of the loans, thus further complicating their usability. 
47  All MIR statistics used in this paper relate to so-called annualised agreed rates, i.e. rates individually agreed, converted to an 
annual basis and covering all interest payments but no other charges that may apply; see also the MIR statistics manual cited 
above. It should also be underlined that under the MIR Regulation interest rate statistics on new business for consumer credit 
and loans to households for house purchases are also derived reflecting the so-called annual percentage rate of charge 
(APRC), i.e. the effective lending rate that includes other charges such as administration and legal fees, as well as, in the case 
of some euro area countries, advertisement and opening commissions, credit insurance premiums, etc. Those charges though 
are not relevant in the context of FISIM measurement as they are typically directly invoiced and therefore are already part of 
the banking sector output. 
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3.2.2 Reference rates on loans to non-financial corporations and households: discussion of 
the data in case of full adjustment 
The proposed method requires data on the current market yield of different types of debt securities with a 
broad coverage of the euro area market. Therefore, bond indices are preferred over individual bonds. The 
bond indices compiled by Merrill Lynch satisfy these criteria.48 
In particular, Merrill Lynch publishes a range of bond indices for non-financial corporations broken down 
by rating category, but only their overall non-financial corporations bond index, which has an average 
rating between BBB and A, is available broken down by maturity band. Our choice is for the latter as it 
allows the matching with the various interest rate categories (possibly after adjusting for the differences in 
maturity/fixation period characteristics).49 
Figure 2 compares the interest rate on new business loans to non-financial corporations with period of 
rate fixation between one and five years with the corresponding one to five years corporate bond yield 
adjusted to a maturity of one year and the one year government bond yields (see Table A2 in Appendix 
1).50 As expected, the loan rate is higher than the (adjusted) corporate bond yield, which in turn is higher 
than the government bond yield. In June 2008 the spread was slightly negative, but otherwise the picture 
is consistent. As the more complete analysis below will demonstrate, negative spreads occur in some 
other instances as well. There we will discuss possible reasons why margins may become negative in 
theory and in practice. Overall, the Merrill Lynch bond index for non-financial corporations in the 
corresponding maturity bands does capture the main developments that also affect loan rates. This may be 
seen as the financial market indicator with the most similar characteristics. It is also worth noting that 
from the summer of 2007 to (at least) end-2008, due to the financial market turmoil the spread of the 
corporate yield over the government bond yield has widened.51 The spread has peaked at the end of the 
first quarter of 2008 when a substantial “flight to security” effect pushed down government bond yields. 
Interest rates on bank loans to non-financial corporations have also risen though the risk-adjusted interest 
margins have been broadly stable, although in the course of the second quarter of 2008 the worsening of 
                                                     
48  See www.mlindex.ml.com for these data as well as the bond index rules and definitions. Merrill Lynch does not produce 
country-specific bond indices as most national debt markets within the euro area do not have the characteristics for the 
derivation of reliable and meaningful bond indices.  
49  This approach is thus implicitly based on the assumption that the risk characteristics of bank loans are similar, on average, to 
those of the corporate bonds included in the overall Merrill Lynch index. This may seem in general rather disputable. On one 
side, one may claim that most borrowers (at least by number) are not investment grade or anyway unable to obtain financing 
on capital markets, so that the credit risk of their bank loans would be typically higher than on corporate bonds. On the other 
side, in many cases banks engage in long-term relationships with their borrowers and thus obtain additional information than 
what is available to capital market participants, so that the price on default risk demanded by the bank might be lower. In 
particular, the former factor seems to mostly affect small-sized loans (below €1mln), while the second should be mostly 
relevant for large-sized loans (above €1mln). While separate interest rate statistics are available under the MIR framework for 
these two categories of loans to non-financial corporations, their matching with reference rates that would address the issues 
described above is not easy and might represent an interesting area for future research. One possible approach could rely on 
the use of Moody’s KMV data that include statistics on expected default frequencies for a large set of euro area non-financial 
corporations, including smaller-sized companies. 
50  The interest rate for non-financial corporations refers to loans with an initial interest rate fixation period between one and five 
years and is the rate on new business. The corporate bond and government bond yields are defined to match this maturity 
band. 
51  The spreads of bonds of financial corporations have widened even more. 
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the economic outlook and the consequent lack of liquidity on euro area bond markets resulted in a sharp 
increase of NFC bond yields which have converged to interest rates on business loans. 
Figure 2, Interest rate on business loans compared to corporate and 





















































Bank loan rate (NB)
Corporate bond yield
Government bond yield
Sources: ECB (MIR interest rates), Thomson Reuters Datastream (Government bonds), Merrill Lynch (Corporate bonds)
Notes: All series for the euro area. Bank loan rate refers to loans to non-financial corporations with an initial rate fixation between 1 and 5 years. 
Corporate bond yield is the yield on the Merrill-Lynch bond index for non-financial corporation bonds with a remaining maturity between 1 and 5 
years, adjusted using government bond yields to a 1-year maturity. Government bond yield is the 1 year constant maturity bond yield  
This illustrates the unappealing choice in troubled financial times: one could either rely on government 
bond yields and see a sharp widening of interest margins or use corporate bond yields and see a 
contracting interest margin. Using government bonds probably overstates margins by more in the recent 
period: why would loans that used to require only about 0.7 percentage points of service margin require in 
the current market developments up to 2.5 percentage points? On the other hand, a disappearing margin is 
likewise implausible.  
For loans to households, it is more challenging to compute interest-rate margins since households do not 
generally raise funds directly from financial markets. Here the most comparable security is securitized 
debt. Securitization is a means for banks to fund further credits as, in its traditional form, it enables to 
remove loans from balance sheet and thus frees up capital to grant new loans. The main advantage of 
securitization is to enable banks to specialize in what they do best, namely originating and monitoring 
debt. However, an important reason for banks to originate a loan for a household in the first place is that 
the fixed cost of gathering and processing credit information on households is too burdensome for 
decentralized financial markets. To allow these loans to be sold in secondary markets in form of asset 
backed securities (ABS) or residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS), a group of similar loans is 
pooled and usually divided into tranches. Defaults in this loan pool will first be borne by the junior 
tranches and the senior tranches will be affected last. As a result, the senior tranches commonly receive an 
AAA credit rating from rating agencies. The current financial market turmoil has raised questions about 
whether these ratings are a good reflection of risk, in particular in the face of high default rates on 
 17
mortgages of subprime borrowers in the US. However, for our proposed method, what is relevant in 
principle is the perceived risk by banks at the time the loan is originated52. 
The limited size of the ABS and RMBS market in Europe compared to the corporate bond market also 
deserves some considerations. While the overall Merrill Lynch bond index for non-financial corporations 
covers around 700 corporate bonds, their index for ABS and RMBS covers only some 30 bonds.53 This 
means that for Europe we only have a single index that covers all maturities and credit ratings, with most 
securities AAA-rated54.55 Despite the small number of securities, the yield spread over government bonds 
is quite stable, highly correlated with the yield spread of AAA corporate bonds (0.85) and almost the 
same size on average56.57 
As the Merrill Lynch ABS/RMBS index has an average residual maturity of around six years, the spread 
over the six-year government bond index for each fixation period band is applied for the matching. 
                                                     
52  Recent literature has elaborated on various agency problems raised by securitisation and resulting in misalignments between 
perceived risks by banks and on the market. For instance asymmetric information may lead to downward biases in 
ABS/RMBS spreads when the loan quality deterioration is not fully recognised by investors and rating agencies. In addition, 
once the default risk is transferred the bank may have a little incentive to monitor the borrowers and to restructure the 
underlying loan portfolios. For a comprehensive review of these and other agency problems related to securitisation, see 
Franke and Krahnen (2008) and references therein. 
53  By comparison, similar indices for the US cover around 3000 corporate bonds and 1500 RMBS or collateralized mortgage 
obligations (CMOs). 
54  Merrill Lynch only provides occasional snapshots of the composition of the index and these suggest limited differences 
between the components. Given the scarcity of information, this is a tentative finding. 
55  As a result of financial engineering the default risk on the most liquid RMBS and ABS is supposed to be minimal and the 
main reason for the positive spread over risk-free government bonds is prepayment risk; see e.g. Rothberg et al (1989). Thus, 
under normal circumstances the yield from these RMBS and ABS will be too low compared to the risk associated with the 
bank loans. However, if the risk is higher, banks will presumably also go to greater lengths to gauge the credit worthiness of 
borrowers, so the service margin for those types of loans is also likely to be higher. One concern in the current climate is that 
the opacity and heterogeneity of RMBS and ABS leads to illiquidity. Also, there is an ongoing reassessment of the value of 
credit ratings and the default risk of these securities. As a result, in current periods yields on these securities are possibly 
higher than warranted by the underlying default risk or the index composition may have changed to include more lower-rated 
securities. 
56  The average spread for AAA corporate bonds was 0.33 percentage points over the period 2003-2007 and for the RMBS/ABS 
bonds it was 0.35 points. 
57  A natural alternative to ABS/RMBS securities could be covered bonds. Also in this case, the securities are backed by a pool 
of assets (typically mortgages or public debt) but the issuer must ensure that such pool consistently backs the instrument. 
This scheme undermines the linkage between the risk characteristics of covered bonds and the underlying pool of assets, thus 
questioning their usage in our approach to FISIM measurement. Other paths are being investigated to improve this 
framework. For example, the development of new statistics on short-term European paper (STEP), which also cover asset-
backed commercial paper, might offer some interesting prospects. For further information on STEP, see 
http://www.ecb.eu/stats/money/step/html/index.en.html). More in the medium to long term horizon, the enhancement of the 
collection of securities statistics on a security by security basis and the related development of the so-called Centralised 
Security Database (CSDB) in the euro area could also allow the derivation of more refined yield curves to be used in the 
framework of FISIM measurement as described in this paper.  
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Figure 3, Interest rate on housing loans compared to ABS/MBS and 




















































Bank loan rate (NB)
ABS/MBS bonds
Government bond yield
Sources: ECB (MIR interest rates), Thomson Reuters Datastream (Government bonds), Merrill Lynch (ABS/MBS)
Notes: All series for the euro area. Bank loan rate refers to loans to household for house purchases with an initial rate fixation between 1 and 5 years. 
ABS/MBS bonds is the yield on the Merrill-Lynch bond index for asset-back and mortgage backed bonds, adjusted using government bond yields to a 4-
year maturity. Government bond yield is the 4 year constant maturity bond yield
 
Figure 3 shows the interest rate on household loans for housing purposes with period of rate fixation 
between one and five years compared to the ABS/RMBS series on yields adjusted to a residual maturity 
of four years and the corresponding four year government bond yield. The interest margin for this type of 
loans varies more than the corporate margins as the inertia of bank interest rates seems greater. On the 
other hand, the interest margin stays positive throughout the period, with the exception of June 2008. As 
for NFCs, periods following the financial turmoil are strongly influenced by the developments on the 
financial markets. While the implicit risk premium measured by the government bond spread of 
ABS/RMBS securities index has widened, seemingly in line with the underlying causes of the credit 
crisis, this market has become almost fully illiquid and cannot, in the context prevailing in the second half 
of 2008, represent a good proxy for the household loans on banks’ balance sheets. For instance, this may 
be the reason underlying the negative margin in June 2008. 
3.2.3 The treatment of other sectors 
Loans and deposits of non-financial corporations and households represent about 80 percent of total 
outstanding amounts of loans and deposits positions involving non financial counterparties. For these 
sectors, the new methodology proposes to derive interest margins on each instrument by comparing the 
MFI interest rate on new business with the corresponding reference rate which represents the yield on 
market securities with similar characteristics. Loans and deposits of other domestic sectors, i.e. the 
government and insurance companies and pension funds, represent another 11 percent while loans and 
deposits from the rest of the world make up the remaining 9 percent.58 Little is known about these loans 
and deposits except their overall size; especially data on corresponding interest rates are not available. 
                                                     
58  These shares are based on the average balance sheet composition over the period from January 2003 to June 2008. Loans and 
deposits of financial institutions are omitted as under the current FISIM regulation, a sector can be either a FISIM producer 
or user, not both. As the focus of this analysis is on different margin estimates, we stay comparable in the coverage of 
sectors. 
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In the case of other domestic sectors, we assume that the interest margins are the same as for non-
financial corporations. This differs from the current approach, where the margin is calculated as a residual 
of the sectoral interest rates on loans and deposits after comparison with the common reference rate.59 
Here we assume constant margins, thus allowing the (implicit) reference rates to be different. Our 
approach is justifiable on various grounds. First, loans and deposits to non-financial corporations likely 
involve similar financial services as those to the government60 and insurance companies and pension 
funds. Second, in many countries banks’ business with these sectors (mainly insurance corporations) has 
a very long maturity and negative margins may result in the framework of the current FISIM 
methodology. Last, given the lack of data on interest rates and flows for these sectors, the current FISIM 
method seems to involve a higher degree of estimation than the alternative proposed. 
When deriving euro area estimates for residents in the rest of the world, we assume that they buy the 
same services as euro area residents. This may be not fully correct as, for example, screening costs 
incurred by banks might be higher for non-resident borrowers. Still, this assumption seems more plausible 
than using, for example, foreign margins (if those were available) as, presumably, foreign customers buy 
financial services from euro area banks rather than their own banks only if their cost appears reasonable 
to them. As no breakdown by sector is available in MFI balance sheet statistics for positions vis-à-vis 
residents of the rest of the world not belonging to the MFI or government sector, we use in this case a 
weighted average of euro area margins based on the sectoral composition of cross-border balances of 
loans and deposits within the euro area.  
Applying this logic for individual euro area countries would require using domestic margins for exports 
from one euro area country to another and foreign margins for imports from another euro area country. 
For imports61 from outside the euro area this is not feasible, so domestic margins will have to be used 
there as well. This approach to the import and export of FISIM also differs from current methods. 
Currently, the external reference rate should be compared to market interest rates on cross-border 
positions within the euro area and for the rest of the world.62 In view of the lack of reliable and detailed 
sectoral data on interest rates and margins for the positions with extra euro area residents, the proposed 
method has the advantage of conceptual clarity and is more appealing from our point of view since it 
focuses on the services provided, rather than trying to estimate the service margin as a residual based on 
                                                     
59  For the purpose of simulating FISIM results under the current methodology, interest rates on loans to the general government 
and insurance corporations and pension funds are estimated using financial market data, while the corresponding interest 
rates on deposits are assumed to be the same as for NFCs. 
60  For the government sector this may not be the case as most transactions (at least those with the central government) are likely 
to be rather automated and involve high volumes, thus implying small service components. On the other side this sector has a 
little weight on the overall deposits and loans activities of the euro area banking sector, thus implying a small impact on the 
final estimates. 
61  The paper is focused on the output of euro area banks and therefore the treatment of the services imported by euro area 
residents is not crucial for our discussion. Nevertheless its relevance for the compilation of non-financial accounts leads to 
include it in our discussion. 
62  In our simulation of the current FISIM official methodology, both the external reference rate and the cross-border interest 
rates are based on estimated interest flows which are respectively derived from inter-bank rates (EURIBOR, LIBOR) for the 
inter-bank component, from MIR rates for the intra euro area positions vis-à-vis non-banks, and from balance of payment 
statistics for the positions vis-à-vis extra euro area non-bank residents. 
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two sets of statistics possibly involving a high degree of estimation and which are neither fully complete 
nor consistent. 
4. FISIM calculations 
4.1 Interest margins 
So far we have discussed what data we use on loan and deposit rates for households and non-financial 
corporations, namely interest rates on new business from the MIR statistics. We also described our 
approach to matching these interest rates to comparable securities traded in the financial markets and how 
to estimate interest margins for the other sectors. We can now move to a discussion of the interest 
margins as estimated in our framework. In the case of loans, the interest margin we calculate is the excess 
a borrower has to pay compared to the market rate to compensate the bank for the information services 
provided. For deposits, it is the opposite: how much less a depositor is willing to accept than the market 
rate in return for the transaction services the bank provides. 
Table 1 gives the broadest set of results on interest margins by comparing the estimates on the different 
financial asset categories for the euro area as a whole in the case of households and non-financial 
corporations.63 Our analysis uses monthly data from January 2003 to June 2008, thus covering 66 months 
(the entire span of the MFI survey on interest rates). We compare three sets of interest margins. The first 
set is calculated by simulating the current approach where implicit interest margins can be obtained by 
comparing MIR rates on outstanding amounts to the internal reference rate. The second set takes into 
account that for longer-term financial assets a term premium is paid, estimated by the yield spread of 
long-term over short-term government bonds. For loans, we also calculate a third set, where the default 
risk is taken into account by using data on corporate bonds and asset and residential mortgage-backed 
securities. Under the new proposed framework, MIR statistics on new business are used and for all 
instruments a weighted average margin is compiled across maturities in the case of deposits and across 
bands of initial interest rate fixation periods in the case of loans using the shares in new business volumes 
as weights. For each set of margins, we compare four statistics, namely the average over the period, the 
standard deviation, the coefficient of variation and the number of negative margins. For a more complete 
overview, the interested reader is referred to Appendix 3 which, for each sector and type of loan and 
deposits, presents in form of time series the three sets of estimated margins, together with the 
corresponding interest and reference rates. 
                                                     
63  Under the MIR Regulation, no interest rate statistics on deposits redeemable at notice placed by non-financial corporations 
are collected given the small significance of this category in the euro area. Our working assumption with this respect is that 
non-financial corporations are granted the same interest rates as households on these instruments. In addition MIR statistics 
on repurchase agreements are collected without a breakdown between households and non-financial corporations; therefore 
for our purposes we use the overall interest rate series as a proxy for the sectoral breakdowns. 
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Table 1, Euro area interest margins on loans and deposits using different reference rates 
(weighted average across maturities, Jan 2003 - Jun 2008, %) 
I II III I II III I II III I II III
Loans
Loans to non-financial corporations 1.73 1.03 0.45 0.46 0.22 0.19 0.26 0.22 0.43 0 0 1
Loans for house purchases 1.92 0.91 0.71 0.86 0.30 0.33 0.45 0.33 0.47 0 0 1
Consumer credit 3.76 3.91 3.63 0.73 0.43 0.50 0.19 0.11 0.14 0 0 0
Other household loans 3.76 1.47 1.32 0.73 0.37 0.35 0.19 0.25 0.27 0 0 0
Business deposits
Overnight 1.71 1.49 0.37 0.38 0.22 0.26 0 0
With agreed maturity -0.06 0.12 0.23 0.06 4.04 0.51 38 0
Redeemable at notice 0.35 0.34 0.32 0.49 0.91 1.42 7 22
Repurchase agreements 0.31 0.07 0.14 0.05 0.44 0.70 0 5
Household deposits
Overnight 2.12 1.90 0.60 0.62 0.28 0.32 0 0
With agreed maturity 0.05 0.25 0.50 0.09 9.70 0.36 36 1
Redeemable at notice 0.76 0.75 0.54 0.72 0.71 0.96 0 2
Repurchase agreements 0.31 0.07 0.14 0.05 0.44 0.70 0 5
Average Coefficient of variation Number of negativesStandard deviation
 
Notes: Interest margins are calculated as the difference between the relevant interest rate minus a reference rate 
Reference rates: 
I (current approach): euro area internal reference rate 
II (term premium correction): for loans with an initial fixed rate period of more than one year, the government bond yield for that 
rate fixation period is used 
III (default risk and term premium correction): in addition to II, an adjustment is made for the higher risk of bank loans using 
bond index yield spreads 
Interest rates: 
I: interest rates on outstanding amounts 
II and III: interest rates on new business 
Interest margins shown are weighted averages of the margins derived for the different maturities and periods of initial interest 
rate fixation. The weights used reflect the outstanding amounts (case I) or the volumes of new business (cases II and III). 
See Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix 1 for further details. 
In the case of loans, the effect of accounting for the term premium and default risk on the average margin 
is as expected: margins decrease. Note that when comparing columns I to II and III, the reference rates 
change to reflect the risk of the loans and the interest rates change from those on outstanding amounts to 
interest rates on new business. In general, the changes in methodology have the largest effect on loans, 
where margins decrease by up to 2.4 percentage points. Actually, many loans, in particular those for 
housing purposes, have fixed rates for longer periods of time and default is an important risk factor as 
well. In addition, the variability of the margins also decreases in both absolute and relative terms in case 
of term premium adjustment as the volatility of the term premium is discounted for. When adjusting for 
default risk as well, the standard deviation of the margins further decreases but this is mostly related to 
lower average margins: in fact in some cases the coefficient of variation is even higher than under the 
current approach as the estimates seem to inherit some of the variability of the implicit default risk 
premium used for the adjustment. Finally, despite the large reductions in average margins, the margins on 
loans remain positive in (almost) all months. The adjustments to the average margins are smaller for 
deposits than for loans as most deposits are short-term while loans cover a wider range of (longer) 
maturity. The effect on variability indicators is also less pronounced but it should be underlined that for 
deposits with agreed maturity our approach delivers much more stable results. On the deposit side, 
interest margins are negative in many months, regardless of whether using the current approach or our 
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suggested alternative. Margins for the sizeable deposit categories (overnight and with agreed maturity) 
are less prone to being negative.64 
There are both conceptual and practical reasons that may explain temporarily negative interest margins. 
First, banks may accept small or even negative margins if a borrower or depositor brings in income from 
deposits or fees for other services. The analogy with a supermarket is useful here: they often price visible 
brand-name products at or below cost to draw in customers, who then spend on other goods. Second, 
long-term business relationships may also play a role: in times of rising market interest rates, banks may 
not raise their loan interest rates by as much or ration credit in return for more favourable margins in 
periods of lower market rates. There may be some support for this in the data as many of the loan interest 
rates are less volatile than the corresponding reference bonds. This is in general indicative of imperfect 
pass-through of market interest rates to retail bank interest rates. Our finding of more negative interest 
margins for deposits than for loans is also consistent with the pass-through literature, where deposit rates 
are generally found to be more inelastic.65 
A more practical reason for some of the negative margins may be shortcomings in the available data, such 
as mismatches between interest rates and bond indices in terms of maturities and risk profiles. For 
example, the two negative values on loans refer to June 2008 and in both cases the bond indices used as 
reference rates show sharp increase which are not matched in the interest rate data (see also Appendix 
3)66. Similarly, for deposits with an agreed maturity of more than two years we have selected five-year 
government bonds as the reference rate for households. However, in Germany deposits are on offer with 
much longer maturities so that a ten-year government bond might have been a more representative 
security. In some countries bank loans to creditworthy firms may also be more prevalent, making a 
corporate bond with a high credit rating a better choice. Another reason for the observed negative margins 
may be sampling error in the MIR survey. The evidence for this is somewhat circumstantial, but the 
interest rates of relatively uncommon loans and deposits tend to be more volatile.67  
                                                     
64  In particular, it should be outlined that most of our negative margins refer to deposits redeemable at notice by NFCs, which 
only account for about 3% of the total NFCs deposits.  
65  See, for instance, Hannan and Berger (1991), Berger and Udell (1992), Elsas and Krahnen (1998), Berlin and Mester (1999), 
Boot (2000), Mojon (2001), De Bondt (2005) and De Graeve et al (2007). Besides relationship banking, other factors can 
contribute to the sluggishness of bank interest rate pass-through. For example, customer switching costs for retail bank 
products can make demand inelastic to price changes (Calem et al (2006)). In addition, when banks set their interest rates 
they take into account the fixed costs of adjusting their retail rates and they may opt for no adjustments especially when 
changes in policy rates are perceived as temporary or are minor (see e.g. Hannan and Berger (1991) and Hofmann and Mizen 
(2004)). Banks also tend to react differently depending on whether policy rates are moving up or down (i.e. the so-called 
asymmetric pass-though; see, for instance, Mester and Saunders (1995), Sander and Kleineier (2004) and Grop et al (2007)). 
Furthermore a higher degree of competition is expected to have a positive impact on the speed and degree of the pass-through 
(Sander and Kleimeier (2004), and Van Leuvensteijn et al (2008)). 
66  As described above, the margins shown in Table 1 are compiled as weighted averages across maturities in the case of 
deposits and across bands of initial interest rate fixation periods in the case of loans. Hence while Figure 2 shows some 
negative margins for loans to NFCs with a fixation period between one and five years in the course of 2003, no negative 
margins are derived for total NFCs loans over that period.  
67  Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the interest rates and we get an indication of how common an instrument is 
in the country by calculating the average volume of new business for the instrument over the entire period and normalizing 
by the average across all instruments. 
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In short, negative margins for certain instrument and years can be explained and do not invalidate the 
basic approach. Negative margins for long periods of time, though, can imply that a different security is 
needed to reflect country-specific circumstances. 
When comparing margins on the different financial instruments, a few observations stand out. First, the 
estimated margins for consumer credit and, to some extent, other household loans are very high compared 
to the other instruments, regardless of the approach taken. This could reflect high information and 
processing costs, but could indicate that a more effective method to account for the higher risk associated 
with these loans should be developed. The frequent absence of collateral for such loans can be used to 
argue either ways: the lack of collateral makes the loan riskier but might also induce more screening and 
monitoring activities by banks. Without further information on the risk of bank portfolios, it is hard to 
make a more definitive assessment but our approach seems to (at least) improve the current methodology. 
In addition, the average margin on consumer credit is lower under the current approach than with the term 
premium correction; this is due to the different evolution of the interest rates for consumer credit NB and 
OA68. 
In Figure 4, we show how the average margin varies by band of initial fixation periods for the different 
types of loans for the euro area, calculated using reference rates that account for both the term premium 
and default risk, i.e. case III in Table 1 above. In general, margins are lower on loans with a longer period 
of initial rate fixation. This holds not only for the euro area as a whole but also for many of the individual 
countries. The main exception is consumer credit with a fixed interest rate for more than five years. The 
pattern is clearer for housing loans, where the margin on loans with a fixation period of less than a year is 
0.85 percent while loans with a fixation period of more than ten years have a margin of only 0.36 percent.  
 
Figure 4, Euro area interest margins on loans by period of initial rate 












<1yr 1-5yr >5yr <1yr 1-5yr 5-10yr >10yr <1yr 1-5yr >5yr <1yr 1-5yr >5yr
Business loans Housing loans Consumer credit Other household loans
 
One possible reason for this pattern is that the screening of new borrowers is an important part of the 
financial services provided to borrowers. As this screening process only takes place before the loan is 
                                                     
68  Over the period under analysis, NB interest rates on consumer credit where, on the average, about 60bp higher than the 
corresponding OA rates, thus yielding higher average margins even after adjusting for the term premium. 
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agreed upon, the associated costs are spread over the life of the loan. Alternatively, it could reflect higher 
administration costs for loans with variable interest rates. This is likely to be a factor for loans to non-
financial corporations: only 13 percent of new loans have a fixed rate for more than one year, but 69 
percent on the outstanding loans have an (original) maturity of more than one year. This implies that most 
loans to non-financial corporations have (fairly) flexible rates and a long maturity. Another possible 
reason is that only low-risk borrowers receive a fixed rate for longer periods of time. In contrast, our 
reference rates are based on bonds with a constant default risk profile across maturities. This would imply 
that our default risk adjustment is overdone for loans with long-term fixed rates. We would need firmer 
evidence, though, before changing the adjustment. 
A further observation is that the margins on loans granted to non-financial corporations are noticeably 
lower than those on (consumption and other purpose) loans to households; only the margins on loans for 
housing purposes are close to the former. An explanation could be that amounts lent to households are 
generally smaller so that banks provide more services per euro lent and need to charge a higher relative 
price to cover their fixed costs. Also, the risk associated with corporate loans may be easier to gauge than 
that of loans to households. This would be the case if non-financial corporations tended to have 
standardized financial reports compared to less standardized or less detailed financial information 
provided by households. Non-financial corporations (in particular large ones) may also be better informed 
and have more bargaining power than households. In addition, large corporate loans are often 
collateralized. Finally, loans to non-financial corporations with a fixation period of more than 5 years 
show small average margins (0.39 percent), but these loans account, on the average, for about 7 percent 
only of the total new business volume of loans to non-financial corporations.  
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Figure 5 shows the average interest margin in the euro area in the case of deposits; this corresponds to 
case II in Table 1 above. Margins for deposits held by non-financial corporations tend to be lower than for 
household deposits, which could be explained by the same reasons as for loans. Furthermore, overnight 
deposits (current accounts) command the highest margins. Banks may charge a high interest margin on 
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these deposits because they provide most transaction services to their customers on this type of accounts. 
Another observation from Figure 5 is that for two categories of deposits, interest margins are negative 
when averaged over the entire period. 
4.2 FISIM results for the euro area 
With a complete set of interest margins, the implications for FISIM (imputed bank output) can be shown. 
Imputed bank output is calculated as: 
(11) i
i
i SmY =  
where Yi is the output associated with financial asset i (loan or deposit), mi is the interest margin and Si is 
the outstanding amount of the corresponding financial asset or liability on the bank balance sheet. 69 As 
discussed above, our margins are calculated using interest rates on new business for each maturity band in 
the case of deposits and for each band of initial interest rate fixation periods in the case of loans, and then 
averaged according to the shares of new business volumes, but these are then applied to outstanding 
amounts. In addition, we apply the margins estimated for non-financial corporations to loans and deposits 
of insurance corporations and pension funds and general government. For an estimate of exported 
financial services, we use a weighted average of the relevant margins, where the weights are given by the 
share in intra euro area cross-border positions.  
The top panel of Table 2 shows three estimates of FISIM by sector: (i) as required in the current FISIM 
regulation, (ii) when the term premium is removed from the interest margins and (iii) when the default 
risk premium for loans is additionally removed. The bottom panel shows the weighted average interest 
margin for each sector, based on the underlying margins for deposits and loans. Note that the differences 
between FISIM under current framework and the two alternatives is not only due to different references 
rates, but also due to the use of interest rates on new business as compared to interest rates on outstanding 
amounts under the current FISIM methodology. 
 
                                                     
69  A critical point has been recently raised that only on-balance sheet activities of other MFIs are taken into account. Once a 
bank loan is securitised, the bank is assumed to be no longer providing services to the borrower. Calculations of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York have shown that treating off-balance sheet lending originated by banks in the same manner as 
on-balance sheet loans would boost bank output by more than 10% for the US. This should be taken into account to avoid 
implausible growth rates: the subprime crisis has resulted in a substantive enlargement of bank balance sheets as the sponsors 
of many structured vehicles have returned back to bank financing. This shift will have, ceteris paribus, the effect of 
artificially boosting financial sector output. See e.g. Ashcraft and Steindel (2008). No detailed simulations have been carried 
out in the case of the euro area, but a very preliminary assessment has led to the conclusion that the impact would be much 
lower in this case. Moreover, care must be taken to avoid double-counting: to the extent that banks receive separate fee 
income for servicing the securitized loans, bank output is correctly measured. 
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Table 2, Imputed banking sector output (FISIM) and interest margins in the euro area by 




Adjusted for term 
premium
Adjusted for term and 
default risk premium
FISIM (€bln)
Total 225.9 172.5 135.0
Non-financial corporations 72.0 47.0 27.1
Households 144.9 100.9 92.3
Insurance companies & pension funds -1.8 2.3 1.9
Government 11.4 10.9 6.1
Exports -0.6 11.4 7.5
Interest margin (%)
Total 1.4 1.0 0.8
Non-financial corporations 1.5 1.0 0.6
Households 1.7 1.2 1.1
Insurance companies & pension funds -0.3 0.3 0.3
Government 1.0 1.0 0.5
Exports 0.0 0.7 0.5  
Notes: FISIM is calculated as the interest margin of each type of loan and deposit times the outstanding balance. The interest 
margins in the bottom panel are weighted averages of loan and deposit margins. Current regulation FISIM uses interest rates on 
outstanding amounts and reference rates which mainly represent weighted averages of inter-bank interest rates. The two 
alternatives use interest rates on new business. When adjusting for the term premium, the government bond yield with the most 
closely matching maturity is used as reference rate. When also adjusting for the default risk premium, yields on corporate bonds 
and residential mortgage- and asset-backed securities are used. See Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix 1 for details. 
Overall, the differences are substantial. Both alternatives show lower FISIM than the current approach: 
the average annual banking sector output is €172.5bln after adjusting for the term premium and €135bln 
after adjusting for the default risk premium as well. These adjustments yield figures that are 24 and 40 
percent lower, respectively, than the data on FISIM under the current framework. While the simulations 
calculated under the current regulation imply an estimated average interest margin of 1.4 percent, this 
falls to 1 and 0.8 percent under the two options described above. The impact differs across sectors, with 
the largest drop in the margin for non-financial corporations and a more moderate adjustment in the 
household sector. Table 1 illustrates why the impact of the two alternatives is larger for non-financial 
corporations than households. For nearly all types of loans and deposits the margins paid by corporations 
are lower than for households, even when a short-term interest rate is used. Any downward adjustment 
will therefore represent a relatively larger part of the margin. A more complete overview on sectoral 
FISIM results and time series is given in Appendix 370. 
Non-financial corporations and households are predominant in total FISIM. While the results obtained for 
these sectors are derived under all frameworks on the basis of reliable sets of statistics, the proposed 
alternatives have the advantage of yielding a much more plausible outcome for FISIM paid by insurance 
corporations and pension funds, general government and the rest of the world. As a result, there are no 
                                                     
70  In particular, Appendix 3 presents detailed results for the new methodology in its two variants compared to the framework of 
1995 ESA. The different approaches are referred to using the syntax of Table 1, i.e. method I refers to the current approach, 
method II performs a term premium correction on the reference rate(s) and method III also takes into account the default risk 
premium in case of loans; in addition, methods II and III use interest rates on new business. 
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instances of negative FISIM for any of the sectors under either of the two alternative approaches 
proposed, unlike the current estimates of FISIM that show frequent and steady negative results. 
 
Figure 6, Euro area imputed bank output (FISIM) and the value of the 
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Figure 6 provides a summary overview on euro area FISIM71. The bottom area shows FISIM calculated 
using interest margins from which both the term premium and default risk have been eliminated. The 
middle area can be interpreted as the default risk premium adjustment. The three areas together 
correspond to the current statistical practice of measuring FISIM, and therefore the top area shows the 
(bias resulting from the inclusion of the) term premium. As might be expected based on the data in Table 
1, the impact of removing risk from the banking sector output is substantial. Risk-adjusted FISIM is on 
average only 60 percent of estimated current-practice FISIM, with default risk accounting for 16 percent 
of the current measure and the term premium for 24 percent. In terms of deliveries to final demand this 
implies, on the average, a possible overestimation between €12.6bln and €21.4bln or 0.16 to 0.27 of euro 
area GDP at current prices. 72 
The impact of removing the remuneration for credit default risk and term premium from the banking 
sector output is substantial. A first important remark regards the sizeable impact of the term premium 
correction over the period from 2003Q3 to 2006Q2 which was characterized by a steep yield curve; 
                                                     
71  It should be stressed that Figure 6 shows euro area results net of FISIM exports; this is needed for comparison purposes as the 
current methodology yields very low FISIM exports. 
72  Assessing the impact on GDP (at current prices) of the new methodology is not straightforward as FISIM affects both 
intermediate and final consumption and requires their bridging with the different types of loans recorded in the context of 
MFI balance sheet statistics. Services provided to corporations (as non-FISIM producers) are intermediate consumption, and 
do not affect GDP. However, services provided to households (as well as to general government and to non-residents) are 
final consumption and add to GDP. An important exception, though, is lending to households for housing purposes, which is 
an intermediate consumption input into the production of these services. Preliminary simplified estimates show that for the 
period January 2003 to June 2008 the contribution of FISIM to GDP would be reduced, on the average, by €21.4bln in case 
of default risk and term premium adjustment, and by €12.6bln in case of adjustment for the term premium only. The 
adjustments respectively represent 0.27 and 0.16 percent of euro area GDP. It should be outlined that this estimate depends 
on the specific implementation of both current-regulation FISIM and our adjusted FISIM. Current FISIM statistics as 
compiled by statistical agencies will in general be different leading to different estimates of this overstatement, although it 
seems plausible that the order of the correction would not change. 
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conversely, this adjustment drops in the course of 2007 because of a flattening yield curve. Secondly, 
while over this period the total default risk correction seems to be broadly stable, in an environment with 
high growth rates on outstanding loans and deposits this mainly reflects a decreasing (average) risk 
premium; see also Section 3.2.2. In addition, the default risk premium correction also appears to decrease 
in the last two quarters of 2007 and to then increase rather sharply in the course of 2008. This 
phenomenon is related to the peculiarity of the financial turmoil observed over this period, which led to 
an increase of the general financial market risks while the borrowers’ credit default risk remained broadly 
unchanged at first, to then increase considerably in 2008.73 
Risk-adjusted FISIM are broadly in line with the evolution of the outstanding amounts on loans and 
deposits which have shown sharp growth rates over the period under analysis. In addition, all related 
interest margins are less volatile than under the current framework (see Appendix 3 for further details); 
the reason is that most of the volatility of the current margins originates from the volatility of the term 
premium and the default risk premium components. By removing these common drivers of the interest 
margins, idiosyncratic movements make up a more substantial part. 
5. Concluding remarks 
Banks do not charge explicit fees for much of the services they provide, so that the value of those services 
needs to be imputed by comparing bank loan and deposit rates to reference rates that serve as a measure 
of opportunity costs of funds. This paper has shown how the euro area banking sector output (FISIM) 
would change if the compensation for bearing risk would be removed from output. Recent theoretic work 
has demonstrated that bearing risk is in general not a productive service as such. Instead, determining 
credit-worthiness of borrowers and assessing the risk is production as it requires labour, capital and 
intermediate inputs. If banks bear risks by holding corporate bonds or equity, this is not considered a 
productive service and, likewise, the systematic risk on bank loans (and deposits) should also be excluded 
from the banking sector output. 
Our empirical application of the risk-adjusted bank output model covers the euro area from the first 
quarter of 2003 to the second quarter of 2008. The results show that if we only remove the term premium, 
the banking sector output is on average 24 percent lower than under the current methodology. If we also 
remove the default risk premium, this output is on average 40 percent lower. In other words, the choice of 
reference rate is crucial and the empirical impact of this choice is substantial. This also has an effect on 
GDP, the size of the economy, to the extent that bank services are part of final demand. For example, 
banking sector output to households falls from an average over the period of €144.9bln to €92.3bln, 
implying a fall in final consumption expenditure of about one percent. Comparable work for the United 
States by Basu et al (2008) has shown an adjustment to banking sector output of a similar magnitude, so 
our findings for the euro area do not depend on specific data or assumptions. 
                                                     
73  In other words, while market interest rates on loans increased reflecting the sharp increase in inter-bank rates with a maturity 
between one month and one year, the bond yields did not completely mirror this change at the beginning, of the turmoil to 
then increase in the course of 2008 reflecting the deterioration of the general economic situation  
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Beneath these headline results, a number of data issues remain. The current financial crisis in particular 
illustrates problems of matching bank loans and financial market securities. Risk premiums have widened 
since the summer of 2007, but bank loans rates have changed by much less. Does this mean bank loan 
rates are slow to adjust? Have service margins decreased? Is there a mismatch between the type of bank 
loans and the debt included in these securities? These questions would need further research to be 
answered, but these questions also arise under the old methodology. There, excessive service margins 
lead to avoid negative interest margins in these times, but the changes in margins are as hard or harder to 
gauge. Since our service margins are closer to what economic theory requires for all the periods under 
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Appendix 1 




Up to 1 year 5-month EURIBOR
Over 1 year and up to 5 years 1Y government bond yield
Over 5 years 5Y government bond yield
Households
For house purchases
Up to 1 year 1Y EURIBOR
Over 1 year and up to 5 years 4Y government bond yield
Over 5 year and up to 10 years 6Y government bond yield
Over 10 years 10Y government bond yield
Consumer credit
Up to 1 year 2-month EURIBOR
Over 1 year and up to 5 years 5Y government bond yield
Over 5 years 5Y government bond yield
Other purposes
Up to 1 year 11-month EURIBOR
Over 1 year and up to 5 years 4Y government bond yield




Deposits with agreed maturity
Up to 1 year 1-month EURIBOR
Over 1 year and up to 2 years 1Y government bond yield
Over 2 years 3Y government bond yield
Deposits redeemable at notice
Up to 3 months 3-month EURIBOR




Deposits with agreed maturity
Up to 1 year 1-month EURIBOR
Over 1 year and up to 2 years 1Y government bond yield
Over 2 years 5Y government bond yield
Deposits redeemable at notice
Up to 3 months 3-month EURIBOR
Over 3 months 2Y government bond yield
Repurchase agreements EONIA   
Acronyms:
NFC: non-financial corporations
Euribor: Euro interbank offered rate
EONIA: Euro overnight index average  
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Up to 1 year ML NFC bond index, 1-5Y minus 3Y government bond yield plus 1Y government bond yield
Over 1 year and up to 5 years ML NFC bond index, 1-5Y minus 3Y government bond yield plus 1Y government bond yield
Over 5 years ML NFC bond index, 5-10Y minus 9Y government bond yield plus 5Y government bond yield
Households
For house purchases
Up to 1 year ML ABS/MBS index minus 6Y government bond yield plus 1Y government bond yield
Over 1 year and up to 5 years ML ABS/MBS index minus 6Y government bond yield plus 4Y government bond yield
Over 5 year and up to 10 years ML ABS/MBS index minus 6Y government bond yield plus 6Y government bond yield
Over 10 years ML ABS/MBS index minus 6Y government bond yield plus 10Y government bond yield
Consumer credit
Up to 1 year ML ABS/MBS index minus 6Y government bond yield plus 1Y government bond yield
Over 1 year and up to 5 years ML ABS/MBS index minus 6Y government bond yield plus 5Y government bond yield
Over 5 years ML ABS/MBS index minus 6Y government bond yield plus 5Y government bond yield
Other purposes
Up to 1 year ML ABS/MBS index minus 6Y government bond yield plus 1Y government bond yield
Over 1 year and up to 5 years ML ABS/MBS index minus 6Y government bond yield plus 4Y government bond yield




Deposits with agreed maturity
Up to 1 year 1-month EURIBOR
Over 1 year and up to 2 years 1Y government bond yield
Over 2 years 3Y government bond yield
Deposits redeemable at notice
Up to 3 months 3-month EURIBOR




Deposits with agreed maturity
Up to 1 year 1-month EURIBOR
Over 1 year and up to 2 years 1Y government bond yield
Over 2 years 5Y government bond yield
Deposits redeemable at notice
Up to 3 months 3-month EURIBOR
Over 3 months 2Y government bond yield





ABS/RMBS: Asset-backed security/Mortgage-backed security
Euribor: Euro interbank offered rate
EONIA: Euro overnight index average 
Notes: Over the preiod under analysis, the average residual maturities of the bonds underlying the indices have been 6 years
 for the ABS/RMBS index, and 3 and 9 years for the corporate indices for the bands 1 to 5 years and 5 to 10 years respectively.   
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Appendix 2. Modelling interest rates into an error-correction framework. 
Error correction models have occupied a prominent role in economic literature to study the transmission 
of monetary policy rates to bank interest rates via changes in market interest rates. Under this framework, 
changes in a bank interest rate B are regressed on simultaneous and lagged changes in a relevant market 
rate M, lagged changes in the bank interest rate itself and include an error-correction term reflecting the 
divergence of the bank rate from its long-run equilibrium relationship with the market rate in the previous 
period. The equation reads as follows: 
ttttttt MBBMMB εβββααα +−−+∆+∆+∆=∆ −−−− )( 3121113121 , 
where ∆ stands for the difference operator and tε  are zero-mean i.i.d. random variables. In particular, the 
coefficients 1α  and 2α  represent the immediate and final pass-through while 1β  relates to the speed of 
adjustment; the latter is also referred to as the cointegration parameter as testing its equality to zero is a 
way to testing for cointegration. For further details, see De Bondt (2005) and reference therein.  
In this paper we have used the error correction model to match each interest rate on deposits and loans 
with its relevant reference rate. In particular, each bank interest rate has been regressed against a spectrum 
of market rates reflecting a maturity falling into the band of maturity or period of rate fixation of the rate, 
and the reference rate has thus been selected performing the model selection on the basis of the Schwarz 
information criterion (or BIC). Estimations have been carried out supplementing MIR statistics for the 
period from January 2003 to June 2008 with historical ECB estimates from January 1999 to December 
2002 when available. Table A3 below provides the details of the model selection. Table A4 thus reviews 
the main results of the estimations for the selected models. 
It should be underlined that there is some evidence that after the outbreak of the financial market 
turbulence in August 2007 the pass-through of retail bank interest rates was somehow affected by the 
money-market malfunctioning, banks’ scramble for safe deposits and flight to safety flows in the 
government bond market. Nonetheless our results would not be too much affected when restricting the 
sample to periods up to June 2007, perhaps hinting that these factors may have started to play an 
important role only after the intensification of the crisis in the second half of 2008. 
  
Table A3, Retail interest rate pass-though process within error-correction framework: model selection 1)
Eonia Eur. 1M Eur. 2M Eur. 3M Eur. 4M Eur. 5M Eur. 6M Eur. 7M Eur. 8M Eur. 9M Eur. 10M Eur. 11M Eur. 12M
Loans
Non-financial corporations
Up to 1 year -503.18 -568.01 -575.24 -606.36 -621.57 -636.43 -634.12 -631.35 -626.66 -621.32 -616.51 -611.52 -607.78




Up to 1 year -580.32 -593.80 -592.63 -604.75 -612.12 -622.48 -629.16 -631.34 -633.94 -635.11 -635.81 -636.56 -638.42
Over 1 year and up to 5 years
Over 5 year and up to 10 years
Over 10 years 2)
Consumer credit
Up to 1 year -355.37 -353.15 -356.17 -354.59 -354.70 -355.26 -355.29 -355.03 -355.11 -355.03 -355.00 -354.91 -355.01
Over 1 year and up to 5 years
Over 5 years
Other purposes
Up to 1 year 2) -264.16 -268.06 -270.01 -272.30 -273.10 -273.86 -274.65 -275.15 -275.37 -275.62 -276.03 -276.55 -276.40
Over 1 year and up to 5 years 2)




Deposits with agreed maturity
Up to 1 year -563.34 -655.89 -620.81 -627.46 -636.79 -632.99 -637.41 -635.45 -632.33 -629.44 -626.49 -623.09 -621.58
Over 1 year and up to 2 years
Over 2 years
Deposits redeemable at notice
Up to 3 months 3)
Over 3 months 3)
Repurchase agreements -657.85 -656.76 -640.66 -620.15 -617.05 -615.54 -614.28 -614.16 -613.50 -612.51 -611.29 -610.16 -608.07
Households
Overnight deposits -721.76
Deposits with agreed maturity
Up to 1 year -604.72 -687.76 -670.14 -673.52 -685.49 -673.40 -671.29 -668.14 -661.05 -655.06 -650.77 -645.55 -642.07
Over 1 year and up to 2 years
Over 2 years
Deposits redeemable at notice
Up to 3 months -703.06 -707.37 -710.51 -710.95
Over 3 months 4) -731.53 -735.96 -741.00 -747.46 -751.07 -753.10 -755.65 -758.03 -760.27 -762.22
Repurchase agreements 3)  
2) Due to the lack of histortical estimates, the sample period is January 2003 to June 2008 for these series.
3) No model selection as margins derived under working assumptions in these cases (see footnote 63)
Acronyms:
Eur: Euro interbank offered rate
GB: Euro area government bond yield curve 
4) While the 12-month Euribor has the highest values of the BIC indicator, we select the 2-year government bond because it performs better than the 
1-year government bond thus indicating that the relevant maturity might be higher than 1-year.
1) The table dispays the value of the Schwarz  Criterion (BIC) for each of the models; non-linear least squares estimates using the Trust-Region 
Reflective algorithm; sample period January 1999 to June 2008 (unless otherwise specified)
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Table A3 (continued), Retail interest rate pass-though process within error-correction framework: model selection 1)
GB 1Y GB 2Y GB 3Y GB 4Y GB 5Y GB 6Y GB 7Y GB 8Y GB 9Y GB 10Y GB 12Y GB 15Y GB 20Y GB 30Y
Loans
Non-financial corporations
Up to 1 year
Over 1 year and up to 5 years -396.99 -392.61 -386.36 -381.06 -376.81
Over 5 years -495.35 -491.00 -487.73 -485.84 -484.59 -483.88 -481.52 -478.60 -474.10 -461.98
Households
For house purchases
Up to 1 year
Over 1 year and up to 5 years -606.92 -618.89 -623.60 -624.51 -620.44
Over 5 year and up to 10 years -623.83 -625.42 -625.39 -623.82 -620.53 -616.91
Over 10 years 2) -380.26 -373.25 -369.27 -367.50 -363.84
Consumer credit
Up to 1 year
Over 1 year and up to 5 years -449.05 -451.85 -453.79 -455.07 -455.77
Over 5 years -401.55 -401.38 -401.10 -400.81 -400.59 -400.04 -399.16 -398.11 -396.49 -394.23
Other purposes
Up to 1 year 2)
Over 1 year and up to 5 years 2) -266.70 -274.61 -279.67 -280.76 -276.48




Deposits with agreed maturity
Up to 1 year
Over 1 year and up to 2 years -167.44 -161.52
Over 2 years -136.94 -136.98 -135.92 -133.95 -131.66 -129.38 -127.54 -126.32 -125.41 -124.54 -123.97 -123.78 -123.17
Deposits redeemable at notice
Up to 3 months 3)




Deposits with agreed maturity
Up to 1 year
Over 1 year and up to 2 years -523.87 -511.17
Over 2 years -459.27 -463.98 -467.14 -467.72 -464.87 -460.25 -454.94 -450.12 -445.38 -439.21 -434.69 -432.14 -424.09
Deposits redeemable at notice
Up to 3 months
Over 3 months 4) -754.76 -759.50 -759.13 -756.38 -753.95 -751.77 -750.82 -749.59 -748.39 -747.31 -745.79 -744.20 -741.57 -729.73
Repurchase agreements 3)  
2) Due to the lack of histortical estimates, the sample period is January 2003 to June 2008 for these series.
3) No model selection as margins derived under working assumptions in these cases (see footnote 63)
Acronyms:
Eur: Euro interbank offered rate
GB: Euro area government bond yield curve 
4) While the 12-month Euribor has the highest values of the BIC indicator, we select the 2-year government bond because it performs better than the 
1-year government bond thus indicating that the relevant maturity might be higher than 1-year.
1) The table dispays the value of the Schwarz  Criterion (BIC) for each of the models; non-linear least squares estimates using the Trust-Region 
Reflective algorithm; sample period January 1999 to June 2008 (unless otherwise specified)
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Correlation Adjusted R2 BIC
Average share of total 




Up to 1 year 0.714 (0.043) * 0.017 (0.035) * -0.153 (0.049) * 0.991 0.803 -636.43 86.9%
Over 1 year and up to 5 years 0.506 (0.107) * 0.973 (0.086) * -0.198 (0.058) * 0.946 0.274 -396.99 6.7%
Over 5 years 0.350 (0.053) * 0.973 (0.094) * -0.149 (0.041) * 0.920 0.399 -495.35 6.4%
Households
For house purchases
Up to 1 year 0.287 (0.037) * 1.284 (0.212) * -0.031 (0.012) * 0.860 0.704 -638.42 47.9%
Over 1 year and up to 5 years 0.248 (0.030) * 1.272 (0.084) * -0.090 (0.020) * 0.920 0.714 -624.51 13.2%
Over 5 year and up to 10 years 0.289 (0.030) * 1.553 (0.148) * -0.056 (0.017) * 0.910 0.749 -625.42 17.2%
Over 10 years 2) 0.182 (0.038) * 1.120 (0.136) * -0.123 (0.033) * 0.836 0.471 -380.26 21.7%
Consumer credit
Up to 1 year 0.300 (0.135) ** 0.794 (1.163) -0.022 (0.036) 0.508 0.067 -356.17 26.5%
Over 1 year and up to 5 years -0.039 (0.063) 0.632 (0.123) * -0.147 (0.035) * 0.610 0.151 -455.76 45.9%
Over 5 years -0.062 (0.080) 0.222 (0.066) * -0.317 (0.073) * 0.370 0.232 -401.55 27.6%
Other purposes
Up to 1 year 2) 0.346 (0.111) * 0.776 (0.055) * -0.271 (0.068) * 0.952 0.367 -276.55 76.5%
Over 1 year and up to 5 years 2) 0.112 (0.069) 1.142 (0.123) * -0.245 (0.051) * 0.809 0.458 -280.76 10.4%
Over 5 years 2) 0.137 0.057) ** 1.198 (0.194) * -0.160 (0.043) * 0.752 0.412 -306.77 13.1%
Deposits
Non-financial corporations
Overnight deposits 0.142 (0.019) * 0.246 (0.091) * 0.032 (0.015) ** 0.858 0.503 -793.07
Deposits with agreed maturity
Up to 1 year 0.552 (0.035) * 1.284 (0.894) 0.020 (0.047) 0.990 0.797 -655.89 98.5%
Over 1 year and up to 2 years 0.481 (0.240) ** 1.162 (0.081) * -0.474 (0.118) * 0.943 0.309 -167.44 0.4%
Over 2 years 0.229 (0.228) 0.627 (0.099) * -0.627 (0.137) * 0.721 0.284 -136.98 1.1%
Deposits redeemable at notice
Up to 3 months 3)
Over 3 months 3)
Repurchase agreements 0.560 (0.040) * 0.917 (0.065) * -0.077 (0.060) 0.995 0.795 -657.85
Households
Overnight deposits 0.141 (0.025) * 0.246 (0.021) * -0.177 (0.058) * 0.965 0.296 -721.76
Deposits with agreed maturity
Up to 1 year 0.433 (0.028) * 0.774 (0.161) * 0.029 (0.028) 0.981 0.807 -687.76 91.2%
Over 1 year and up to 2 years 0.233 (0.059) * 1.553 (0.919) -0.030 (0.032) 0.914 0.469 -525.87 3.2%
Over 2 years 0.263 (0.060) * 1.136 (0.096) * -0.167 (0.033) * 0.881 0.365 -467.72 5.6%
Deposits redeemable at notice
Up to 3 months 0.061 (0.028) ** 0.2561 (0.026) * -0.156 (0.033) * 0.856 0.253 -710.95 93.7%
Over 3 months 0.090 (0.019) * 0.913 (0.203) * -0.022 (0.010) ** 0.826 68.390 -759.50 6.3%
Repurchase agreements 3)  
2) Due to the lack of historical estimates, the sample period is January 2003 to June 2008 for these series.
3) No model selection as margins derived under working assumptions in these cases (see footnote 63)
4) Averages derived for the period January 2003 to June 2008.
1) Non-linear least squares estimates using the Trust-Region Reflective algorithm; sample period January 1999 to June 
2008 unless otherwise specified; * and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% level respectively; standard errors are 
reported in parantheses; model selection  is performed on the basis of the Schwarz  Criterion (BIC).
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Banking sector output with domestic residents
1995 ESA approach vs enhanced methodology - Loans for the euro area
(Quarterly output; EUR million)
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1995 ESA approach vs enhanced methodology - Deposits and loans for the euro area
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Banking sector with domestic residents
1995 ESA approach vs enhanced methodology - Loans to households for the euro area
(percentage points for interest rates and margins; EUR million for stocks)
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Banking sector with domestic residents
1995 ESA approach vs enhanced methodology - Loans to other sectors for the euro area
(percentage points for interest rates and margins; EUR million for stocks)
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Banking sector with domestic residents
1995 ESA approach vs enhanced methodology - Deposits by households in the euro area
(percentage points for interest rates and margins; EUR million for stocks)





Overnight deposits: interest rates





3.50 Term premium adjustment (II) 1995 ESA (I)
Overnight deposits: margins









Deposits with agreed maturity: interest rates




1.00 Term premium adjustment (II) 1995 ESA (I)
Deposits with agreed maturity: margins








Deposits redeemable at notice: interest rates




3.00 Term premium adjustment (II) 1995 ESA (I)
Deposits redeemable at notice: margins








Repurchase agreements: interest rates




0.60 Term premium adjustment (II) 1995 ESA (I)
Repurchase agreements: margins











Banking sector with domestic residents
1995 ESA approach vs enhanced methodology - Deposits by non-financial corporations in the euro area
(percentage points for interest rates and margins; EUR million for stocks)
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Banking sector with domestic residents
1995 ESA approach vs enhanced methodology - Deposits by the general government in the euro area
(percentage points for interest rates and margins; EUR million for stocks)
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Banking sector with domestic residents
1995 ESA approach vs enhanced methodology - Deposits by insurance corporations and pension funds in the euro area
(percentage points for interest rates and margins; EUR million for stocks)
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